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Russia: 2035

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Russian President Vladimir Putin formally approved the Russian Federation’s long awaited fifteen year plan for the Arctic last week. The plan, titled “Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy to 2035” addresses Russia’s Arctic environmental policy, infrastructure development, and security position. Russia’s 2035 strategy details a more assertive approach to the High North, in keeping with recent increases in development and military activity.

Economic Development

The Northern Sea Route (NSR), also known as the Blue Silk Road, was emphasized as being critical to Russia’s liquified natural gas (LNG) extraction and transportation strategy. LNG and freight are critical for Arctic job creation, with Basic Principles 2035 laying out a target of 200,000 new jobs in the next 15 years.

Environmental Concerns

‘Basic Principles 2035’ takes a pragmatic approach to climate change. The document singles out the possibility of foreign powers contaminating Russia’s Arctic waters and makes general paeans to global warming. However, Russia departs from the usual platitudes to emphasize the potential economic gains from Arctic warming–longer periods ice-free allow for cheaper, faster trade and transit. These periods also enable energy extraction in previously inaccessible areas. Russia is rightly focused on oil and gas over renewables and poised to maintain its energy dominance with redoubled Arctic extraction.

Security Policy

Most of Russia’s highlighted security concerns are domestic troubles, such as a dearth of Arctic public-private partnerships, a lack of technological development, aging and nonexistent infrastructure, and demographic decline. However, Basic Principles 2035 also highlights the need for military modernization in the face of increased Arctic NATO activity. The cornerstone of Russia’s Arctic leap forward is the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system, which hastens information transmission and models battles in real time to determine strategies and project outcomes. Russia also rightfully warns against ‘discrediting its economic claims’ in its territory, the largest of any Arctic state.

“Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy to 2035” is a continuation of previous Russian policy, and contains essentially no surprises. The sheer expanse of Russia’s Arctic territory makes the Federation a de facto regional leader. Basic Principles 2035 outlines the economic development and national security measures necessary to improve quality of life and maintain strategic dominance in the High North.

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Espionage from the East

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This week, Norway accused one of its own citizens and a Russian official of espionage. The resulting arrest and expulsion are a low point amid the Arctic states’ already sanctions-strained relationship.

On August 17th, Norwegian police apprehended a man suspected of passing state secrets to Russia. The suspect was caught selling energy information acquired via his position at risk management firm DNV GL.

His handler was also caught, and a briefcase seized. The contents have not been disclosed to the public. The Russian Embassy in Norway characterized the arrest and seizure as baseless fear-mongering. Russia took this stance previously when Norway conducted war games with NATO forces along the countries’ borders.

“PST arrested a Norwegian citizen in Oslo on Saturday, 15 August. The man is accused of having handed over information to a foreign state that could harm basic national interests,”
Diplomatic Troubles

Two days later, on August 19th, Norwegian officials expelled a member of the Russian Embassy’s trade division. The envoy was accused of involvement in the espionage scheme. The Russian Embassy in Oslo protested the decision, but no retaliatory action has been taken.

The row represents Russia’s larger diplomatic difficulties in the High North. NATO-aligned Scandinavia fears the Federation will infringe on its sovereignty and is an integral part of the Crimean sanctions regime. As a result, relations between the Arctic sub-region and Russia can only advance so far, leading Russia to look toward China for capital and cooperation. However, Russia also fears for its sovereignty, and seeks to diversify its Arctic partnerships.

Norway’s Relationship with Russia and China

The state of Norway’s relationships with China and Russia will be important for places like Kirkenes. The port town is courting Chinese infrastructure investment, but is also a borderland hotspot for commercial activity. Travel between Russia and Norway in the area is common, with Norwegians crossing to buy Russian fuel and Russians journeying over for goods and services. Though this espionage incident is relatively minor, Norway’s long-term relationship with Russia will play an important part in Kirkenes’ future and the region’s.

“This is the center of Norway … This is the closest Norway comes to something that is important regarding foreign policy. Nothing is happening in Oslo”

Rune Rafaelsen, Mayor of Sør-Varanger, Norway

Given the European Arctic’s steady remilitarization, espionage is bound to increase. Until there is a comprehensive end to Western sanctions, covert operations accompanied by occasional shows of force will remain the regional norm.

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Russia’s 15 Year Plan for the Arctic

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The Russian Arctic is remote, sparsely populated, and underdeveloped. As with the rest of the Arctic, this trifecta of challenges lends itself to organized, state-sponsored development. Accordingly, the Russian Federation recently unveiled a 15 year Arctic plan. “Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035” is an ambitious, goal-setting white paper in line with Russia’s previous Arctic policy.

Infrastructure and the North Sea Route

Infrastructure investment is slated to increase substantially. By 2035, the Federation will overhaul four airports, significantly expand preexisting railway and seaport networks, and construct at least 40 Arctic-capable ships. State gas and oil conglomerates will oversee the development of the North Sea Route (NSR). Today, the NSR hosts nearly 30 million tons of shipped goods. By 2035, Russia hopes to increase this to 80 million tons. In pursuit of this lofty goal, all new fiber-optic communication cables will be laid on the NSR seabed.

Poverty, Petrochemicals, and Industrialization

Unemployment and poverty have plagued the Russian Arctic for generations. As mentioned above, infrastructure development is a core component of the 2035 plan’s anti-poverty measures. Tax incentives are on offer for companies that invest in Arctic petrochemical projects. However, the plan goes farther. Direct payouts will be given to Russians who relocate to the High North. Demographic decline poses a real challenge to future exploitation of the region’s resources. Environmental effects, though considered, are of secondary importance compared to the national security implications of Siberian poverty, depopulation, and underdevelopment.

Territorial Integrity and Careful Cooperation

The Russian government rightfully sees China as a potential threat to its sovereignty. As such, Arctic cooperation has been reframed in terms of ‘stable mutual benefit’ versus unconditional cooperation. Russia is keen on developing investment relationships with other Arctic Council observer states to its east, like South Korea and Japan. Reducing reliance on Chinese capital is of concern for Russia, but policymakers are careful to avoid derailing the current Sino-Russian relationship and its ‘stable mutual benefit’. 

Military modernization and ‘defensive military development’ remains a priority. The planned upgrades Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems will further integrate Russian Arctic military capabilities. However, the 2035 plan emphasizes international bodies and diplomatic organs as the primary means of ensuring territorial integrity. Russia is on track to hold the Arctic Council Presidency in 2021. The Federation accordingly seeks to empower the organization in dispute resolution, policymaking and so on. Furthermore, Russia will continue pressing its claims via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Responding to the 2035 Plan

Russia’s 2035 plan is sound Arctic policy, emphasizing national security and much needed regional development. Arctic-American security and quality of life depends on a similarly long-term vision for Alaska. The United States must embrace infrastructure development, anti-poverty policy, and military modernization to defend its interests and people.

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The Arctic “Dragon-Bear”

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Russia and China are regular collaborators. Their ‘special relationship’ began with the Soviet Union’s collapse, and developed rapidly after international backlash to Crimean annexation. The U.K. Chair of the House of Commons Defense Select Committee considers the two ‘one alliance’ in the Arctic.

Their Arctic relationship is primarily economic and diplomatic, with limited military cooperation. China has capital, and Russia has resources. Russia has access to Arctic institutions, and China needs in. Despite this joint success, the ‘Dragon-Bear’ alliance’s mutual geopolitical suspicions pose a threat to the duo’s long term success. 

Joint Projects and Collaboration

Russia and China recently completed the ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline, a $400 billion project carrying natural gas from northeast Russia to the coal-fired Jilin province. As a result of the first’s success, a ‘Power of Siberia II’ is under discussion. The pipeline typifies one half of the Sino-Russian Arctic alliance, with China providing the investment necessary to exploit Russian resources. 

The other half of the Arctic Dragon-Bear hinges on institutional access. Climate researchers from both countries agreed last year to establish a joint research station. Though the project explicitly concerns itself with the High North’s changing ecosystem, the center serves a dual-purpose. Chinese politician Arken Imirbaki took the opportunity to re-emphasize his country’s legitimate interests in the region as a ‘near-Arctic’ country. Sino-Russian civilian collaboration in the Arctic inevitably normalizes China’s presence in the region. 

Areas of Tension

Russia understandably sees the Arctic as integral to its national security and identity. Accordingly, the Federation is wary of allowing unrestricted access to its sparsely-populated eastern flank. Since Russia’s Arctic development corporations require significant capital and technology investment, China is unwilling to partner without substantial control. This issue prevents the alliance from integrating further. 

China’s ‘near-Arctic’ interests, though recognized by Russia, are an existential threat to the Federation’s sovereignty. The People’s Republic is granted significant access to pre-existing Arctic institutions, but Russia actively discourages the formation of new, broader organizations. The Kremlin has repeatedly “underlined that observer status can be reconsidered and even revoked” in the event of threatening behavior. Last month, Russia sent a heavy-handed signal: accusing its leading Arctic researcher of spying for China. This allegation comes just months after Putin’s ‘Arctic 2035’ policy rollout.

Diplomatic Diversification

Both China and Russia are on the prowl for alternative partners in the region. Beijing is attempting to establish strong bilateral relationships with other Arctic countries. Russia is redeveloping key European partnerships as Crimean annexation fades from memory. Additionally, the Federation continues to expand cooperation with Arctic Council observer states Japan and South Korea. 

Countering the ‘Dragon-Bear’

Though American foreign policy makers remain adamantly opposed, a relaxation of measures against Russia is the clearest way to disrupt the ‘Dragon-Bear’ and normalize US-Russia relations in the Arctic. In 2012, President Medvedev expressed fears of the Federation becoming China’s ‘resource appendage’. Since, however, the number of joint infrastructure projects has exploded. Some Chinese investment in Russia’s far-east is to be expected and welcomed. However, the current level of exclusivity China enjoys is a looming threat to Russian sovereignty. Deprived of meaningful alternatives, Russia may have no choice but to integrate further into the ‘Dragon-Bear’—with all that entails for a free and fair Arctic.

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Dual-Purpose Diplomacy in the Arctic

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China’s rise is being felt across the world, and the Arctic is no exception. At the core of their ongoing near-Arctic power play is a ‘dual purpose’ approach. Under this model, activities like research expeditions lay the groundwork for military activities and power projection. 

The Danish intelligence service and American Department of Defense agree: China’s civilian research programs are likely being organized with future nuclear submarine deployments in mind. China has sought an Arctic submarine presence since 1959, under Mao Zedong. The logic is simple: any Russian or American ICBMs headed for China will fly over the Arctic Sea. A network of nuclear submarines would serve as a powerful deterrent.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection

In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) official policy was “near seas defense, far seas protection”. Neither China’s Arctic or National Defense policy papers, released in 2018 and 2019 respectively, mentioned a militarized presence in the High North. Crucially, both of these publications are intended to be widely read by foreign audiences.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection, Oceanic Presence, and Expansion into the Two Poles

In a 2018 issue of the PLAN’s official newspaper, Senior Captain Yu Wenbing noted a tactical transition from the PLAN’s 2015 slogan. Now, their policy would be “near seas defense, far seas protection, oceanic presence, and expansion into the two poles”. PLAN engineer Ni Hua expects required infrastructure development to be complete by 2030. There are countless other examples of PLAN officials invoking Arctic civilian infrastructure in models, projections, and policy proposals.

Routine research and economic activity are normalizing Chinese presence in the High North. While areas of study like bathymetrics and Arctic acoustics are nominally civilian, their most common applications are military. Both are essential for submarine and naval navigation. These operations typify the dual purpose paradigm at the center of Chinese Arctic operations.

Chinese Cooperation with Russia

China’s cooperation with Russia has greatly accelerated their Arctic development. The two cooperate intensively in Arctic trade, research, infrastructure, and general development of the North Sea Route. However, Russia has asserted itself against China in the past. In 2012, the Federation blocked Chinese research vessels from utilizing the North Sea Route. Should joint Arctic development cease to be mutually beneficial, Russian security concerns could unravel China’s advancements in the High North.

Arctic nations must familiarize themselves with China’s dual purpose approach in order to preserve their sovereignty. Deals and projects which may be profitable in the short term may easily become the foundation of future Chinese aggression. Without defensive measures, the High North could be dominated by a country over 1,000 miles away.