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South Korea and the Arctic

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Since South Korea gained observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, the country has cultivated strategic Arctic partnerships. Most of their involvement in the region depends on these partners due to their “near-Arctic” status. Korea is primarily concerned with Arctic energy, and outlined the region’s importance in their 2012 policy masterplan.

Energy Dependence and Diversification

Importing a whopping 98% of its fossil fuels (which account for a majority of the country’s energy consumption), South Korea is highly dependent on the Gulf states. The country’s leadership is looking to diversify its energy imports, as well as produce more of their own. As a result, Korea is turning toward Russia, China, and other Asian countries for their energy needs.

Korea, Russia, and the New North

Korea’s “New Northern Policy” aims to develop stronger bilateral ties with Russia in the face of Western sanctions. As part of this, the two countries agreed to the “Nine Bridges Initiative”, a series of Arctic-related, mutual projects. South Korea built two-thirds of the world’s LNG tankers in operation today. Accordingly, the Republic aims to integrate its own Arctic-capable ships further into Russian LNG shipping. On land, the two countries are partnering to construct an LNG pipeline originating in Russia, passing through North Korea, and feeding into South Korea.

The Asian Arctic-Adjacent States, Scandinavia, and North America

The Republic’s Arctic ties with China and Japan are mostly research-related, but are moving toward further commercial integration. All three countries maintain an interest in the opening Northeast Passage, which significantly reduces shipping times to Europe. The possibility of a sub-organization for the three Arctic-adjacent Asian states is hotly-debated, but not yet realized. In the meantime, Korea remains an active observer in the Arctic Council, and its leadership conducts goodwill visits to the Scandinavian Arctic frequently.

Korea’s Arctic Future

Korean involvement in the Arctic revolves around trade and energy. Korea’s future in the Arctic depends largely on how ownership of emerging energy resources is decided and managed. The country is not positioned to unilaterally project power throughout the region, but the formation of sub-councils for the Arctic-adjacent Asian states could give the Republic increased diplomatic leverage.

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Dual-Purpose Diplomacy in the Arctic

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China’s rise is being felt across the world, and the Arctic is no exception. At the core of their ongoing near-Arctic power play is a ‘dual purpose’ approach. Under this model, activities like research expeditions lay the groundwork for military activities and power projection. 

The Danish intelligence service and American Department of Defense agree: China’s civilian research programs are likely being organized with future nuclear submarine deployments in mind. China has sought an Arctic submarine presence since 1959, under Mao Zedong. The logic is simple: any Russian or American ICBMs headed for China will fly over the Arctic Sea. A network of nuclear submarines would serve as a powerful deterrent.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection

In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) official policy was “near seas defense, far seas protection”. Neither China’s Arctic or National Defense policy papers, released in 2018 and 2019 respectively, mentioned a militarized presence in the High North. Crucially, both of these publications are intended to be widely read by foreign audiences.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection, Oceanic Presence, and Expansion into the Two Poles

In a 2018 issue of the PLAN’s official newspaper, Senior Captain Yu Wenbing noted a tactical transition from the PLAN’s 2015 slogan. Now, their policy would be “near seas defense, far seas protection, oceanic presence, and expansion into the two poles”. PLAN engineer Ni Hua expects required infrastructure development to be complete by 2030. There are countless other examples of PLAN officials invoking Arctic civilian infrastructure in models, projections, and policy proposals.

Routine research and economic activity are normalizing Chinese presence in the High North. While areas of study like bathymetrics and Arctic acoustics are nominally civilian, their most common applications are military. Both are essential for submarine and naval navigation. These operations typify the dual purpose paradigm at the center of Chinese Arctic operations.

Chinese Cooperation with Russia

China’s cooperation with Russia has greatly accelerated their Arctic development. The two cooperate intensively in Arctic trade, research, infrastructure, and general development of the North Sea Route. However, Russia has asserted itself against China in the past. In 2012, the Federation blocked Chinese research vessels from utilizing the North Sea Route. Should joint Arctic development cease to be mutually beneficial, Russian security concerns could unravel China’s advancements in the High North.

Arctic nations must familiarize themselves with China’s dual purpose approach in order to preserve their sovereignty. Deals and projects which may be profitable in the short term may easily become the foundation of future Chinese aggression. Without defensive measures, the High North could be dominated by a country over 1,000 miles away.

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A Fool’s Gold Deal

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In the upper reaches of Canada’s Nunavut province, the Inuit of Hope Bay anxiously await their gold mine’s fate. Shandong Gold (SD Gold), a Chinese state-owned mining megacorporation, has arranged to purchase Hope Bay gold mine. 

The owner of Hope Bay mine, Toronto’s TMAC Resources, is selling off the development intensive project at a premium. Though Canada boasts five of the ‘Big 10’ companies, Hope Bay and Nunavut are unique in that they employ primarily indigenous workers. In fact, they’re obligated by Canadian law to meet certain indigenous employment and compensation requirements.

In spite of this, the sale has not received approval from the Kitikmeot Inuit Association. Though not legally necessary, approval is of symbolic importance. Transferring mine ownership outside of Canadian hands may lead to complications in far-off courts with international tribunes. 

Are China’s interests in the Arctic benign?

Though some ‘experts’ claim China’s interests are purely commercial, Hope Bay would be yet another link in their ‘Polar Silk Road’. Its position along the Northwest Passage is invaluable for Arctic power projection. Given other recent PRC acquisitions, it is unrealistic to separate commercial interests from geostrategic influence. Money is power, after all.

Rylund Johnson, independent legislative representative of Yellowknife North, has called on Canada’s federal government to block the sale. In a statement, Johnson had this to say:

“If Canada had real economic development corporations and gave the North’s indigenous development corporations meaningful capital, then we could actually own some of our own resources as a country … As it is set up right now, China will keep stepping in when Canada fails to invest in its own development.”

A familiar story. Where Arctic nations fail to provide for their own people, or steward their own resources, the People’s Republic fills the gap. Cash for corporations, and polar power projection for China. 

Canada must defend its sovereignty and citizenry: reject the acquisition of Hope Bay. 

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COVID-19 in the Cryosphere

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In the popular imagination, the Arctic is a frigid, barren expanse of silence and snow. However, the region is host to a bustling network of research, trade, industry, and tourism. The High North is subject to similar coronavirus containment measures as the non-polar world, though with some notable differences. COVID-19 is highlighting old challenges and creating new opportunities in the Arctic.

The Polarstern

The German research icebreaker Polarstern was moored in ice for a year-long study of global warming. The Polarstern was to be a ‘drifting observatory’, and represented a leap forward in Arctic climate study. COVID-19 disrupted the operation in April as a result of supply line cutoffs and crew exchange complications. After a three week pause in research, the ship will relocate to another ice floe to continue its mission.

Arctic Wind Farms

The first ever industrial-scale Arctic wind farm will continue development as planned, with no COVID delays. Enel Russia is constructing the plant near the port city of Murmansk, the largest city in the Arctic. The northern Kola region possesses high wind-energy potential, and the plant will connect to Russia’s national grid upon completion. 

Local Greenlandic Tourism

Greenland’s state-owned tourism agency is launching a new ‘staycation’ program in an attempt to support the country’s struggling travel industry. The domestic tourism push is geared toward connecting Greenlanders with their rich traditions and natural landscapes. Aside from essential supply trips, the island was totally shut down to defend against the coronavirus. With the tourism sector having grown 20% from 2015 to 2016, the total isolation policy threatens to derail future expansion. 

Travel within Greenland is difficult as the island lacks a highway or rail system. Most movement between towns and territories is conducted by air, sea or dogsled. However, a boost in domestic tourism would be a boon for the many Greenlandic businesses that fall outside of the territory’s hegemonic fishing industry.

The Arctic will adapt to a new future post-COVID

COVID-19 has significantly disrupted the Arctic, but long-term investment and development is mostly unaffected. The region is simply too valuable to be neglected or abandoned, and will likely fare well in the post-pandemic world economy.