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Russia and China’s Maritime Advancements

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This week, both Russia and China successfully completed two long term naval operations. The Russian vessel “Akademic Aleksandrov” returned to port after a months-long military research assignment. China’s Xue Long 2 icebreaker arrived in Shanghai after two and a half months in the Arctic.

The “Akademic Aleksandrov” — Photo courtesy of the Northern Fleet

The “Akademic Aleksandrov” carries nuclear ‘mini-submarines’, and its research expeditions are highly secretive. Prior expeditions and trials have focused on the development of underwater drone capabilities, though it is unknown whether this mission included drone testing.

The Norwegian Response

Lieutenant-General Morten Haga-Lunde, Head of the Norweigan Foreign Intelligence Service, chafed at Russia’s recent activity in the region. Haga-Lunde made reference to the Losharik submarine accident in his most recent statement on Russian reactor-powered submarine research and ‘seabed warfare’ programs. In his presentation of the Intelligence Services’ annual report, Haga-Lunde stated:

“The development will bring, additional to the military challenges, also challenges related to both environment and security. In 2019, about 25 Russians were killed during military activity near Norway…I consider the risk for more such unintended incidents in our neighborhoods to be big in the years to come.”

Lieutenant-General Morten Haga-Lunde, Head of the Norwegian Foreign Intelligence Service

With Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg striking a more defensive posture toward Russia and China, the recent “Akademic Aleksandrov” test may coarsen relations further.

The China Connection

The Xue Long 2 sailed over 12,000 nautical miles on its inaugural journey, and represents a substantial victory for China’s Arctic efforts. Though the icebreaker collected sediment samples and conducted climate research, the expedition also served to legitimize China’s presence in the region. The People’s Republic’s heavy investment in the Arctic will only increase as the region’s economic and military value expands.

The Xue Long 2

Russia and China are organized, efficient, and proactive in advancing their Arctic interests. The United States, Canada, and Scandinavia must mount a similarly coherent response in order to safeguard their own stake in the High North.

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The Barents Sea

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This week, NATO naval and air forces conducted training operations in the Barents Sea. Norwegian, British, and American ships sailed through Russia’s exclusive economic zone north of the Kola Peninsula. The drills are a landmark moment in the region’s remilitarization.

Norway’s NATO Participation on the Rise

British and American forces conducted similar exercises in May, without Norway and Denmark. The latter pair’s participation this week is a symbol of Norway’s post-Crimea position toward Russia. At one point, Norwegian ships made cordial visits to Russian military ports. Now, they play war games in Russia’s backyard. These exercises are doubly significant considering Russia regularly uses the Barents Sea for its own drills.

Norway’s participation comes just months after PM Erna Solberg highlighted Russia and China as possible threats. Additionally, her administration also pledged to increase military spending by $1.7 billion over the next eight years. If this shift becomes permanent policy, Norway may become a regular presence in NATO drills north of the Arctic Circle.

“These [China and Russia] are countries where the authorities do not see the value of neither democracy, rule of law, nor the fact that people have undisputed rights… Over the last years, these forces have become increasingly visible and gained more influence.”

Norwegian Prime minister Erna Solberg

The United Kingdom justified its participation using familiar rhetoric, with Defense Secretary Ben Wallace stating: “The UK is the closest neighbour to the Arctic states. In addition to preserving UK interests we have a responsibility to support our Arctic allies such as Norway to preserve the security and stability of the region”. Although Norway surely welcomes the support, Russia has legitimate objections to the UK’s near-Arctic presence. These objections would carry more weight if Russia did not invite its own near-Arctic partner, China, into the region.

The Arctic as a Proving Ground

As competition over the region’s valuable resources and thoroughfares intensifies, NATO and non-NATO tit-for-tat activity will increase. Near-Arctic powers like Britain, China, Japan and Korea will inevitably complicate things further. The Arctic’s remilitarization is inevitable.

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The Sino-Norwegian Relationship

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Norway’s relationship with China is as tumultuous as it is brief. Although the countries conduct trade worth billions of dollars per year, diplomatic relations were suspended from 2010 to 2016. Chinese Foreign Minister asserted “Norway deeply reflected upon the reasons why bilateral mutual trust was harmed” since dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Since, Chinese economic and political activity has steadily increased.

Recent Developments and the Narvik Shipment

In May, the Chinese government acquired a substantial share of Norwegian Air via state-owned companies. Around the time of this acquisition, Norwegian State Secretary Audun Halvorsen contradicted the Prime Minister’s tough tack on China. Economic integration is proceeding apace: an outbound shipment from China recently reached Norway’s Narvik Seaport in under two weeks.

The shipment functions as proof-of-concept for China’s Polar Silk Road, cutting travel time by over half when compared with nautical transport. Narvik’s small town economy stands to gain significantly should the route become reality. 

Small Town Silk Roads

Over the objections of local officials, Norway’s state highway department greenlit the Chinese state owned Sichuan Road and Bridge Group’s construction of Narvik’s Hålogaland Bridge. Federal officials feared that Chinese retaliation for a rejected bid would affect the two countries’ pending free-trade agreement. 


Chinese capital is simply irresistible to the small, often increasingly post-industrial towns of Scandinavia’s Arctic. The North Sea city of Kirkenes hosted a delegation last May from the state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), hoping to secure a port infrastructure development agreement.

Potential Responses

With China seeking Arctic power projection and Eurasian economic integration, a closer relationship with Norway is as of now inevitable. China’s surgical engagement in the Nordic country’s small towns and coastal hinterlands will continue without a unified national or regional policy toward the People’s Republic. The 2020 Nordic Foreign Security and Policy Report acknowledges China as a potential cause for concern, and establishes the need for such a unified approach. 

The void Chinese government capital and development fills is real, and simply locking the power out is not enough. For Norway to maintain its sovereignty, alternative sources of investment are necessary. A renewed American focus on Arctic development is essential to counter China’s one-town-at-a-time integration of the High North into its Polar Silk Road. 

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The Arctic “Dragon-Bear”

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Russia and China are regular collaborators. Their ‘special relationship’ began with the Soviet Union’s collapse, and developed rapidly after international backlash to Crimean annexation. The U.K. Chair of the House of Commons Defense Select Committee considers the two ‘one alliance’ in the Arctic.

Their Arctic relationship is primarily economic and diplomatic, with limited military cooperation. China has capital, and Russia has resources. Russia has access to Arctic institutions, and China needs in. Despite this joint success, the ‘Dragon-Bear’ alliance’s mutual geopolitical suspicions pose a threat to the duo’s long term success. 

Joint Projects and Collaboration

Russia and China recently completed the ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline, a $400 billion project carrying natural gas from northeast Russia to the coal-fired Jilin province. As a result of the first’s success, a ‘Power of Siberia II’ is under discussion. The pipeline typifies one half of the Sino-Russian Arctic alliance, with China providing the investment necessary to exploit Russian resources. 

The other half of the Arctic Dragon-Bear hinges on institutional access. Climate researchers from both countries agreed last year to establish a joint research station. Though the project explicitly concerns itself with the High North’s changing ecosystem, the center serves a dual-purpose. Chinese politician Arken Imirbaki took the opportunity to re-emphasize his country’s legitimate interests in the region as a ‘near-Arctic’ country. Sino-Russian civilian collaboration in the Arctic inevitably normalizes China’s presence in the region. 

Areas of Tension

Russia understandably sees the Arctic as integral to its national security and identity. Accordingly, the Federation is wary of allowing unrestricted access to its sparsely-populated eastern flank. Since Russia’s Arctic development corporations require significant capital and technology investment, China is unwilling to partner without substantial control. This issue prevents the alliance from integrating further. 

China’s ‘near-Arctic’ interests, though recognized by Russia, are an existential threat to the Federation’s sovereignty. The People’s Republic is granted significant access to pre-existing Arctic institutions, but Russia actively discourages the formation of new, broader organizations. The Kremlin has repeatedly “underlined that observer status can be reconsidered and even revoked” in the event of threatening behavior. Last month, Russia sent a heavy-handed signal: accusing its leading Arctic researcher of spying for China. This allegation comes just months after Putin’s ‘Arctic 2035’ policy rollout.

Diplomatic Diversification

Both China and Russia are on the prowl for alternative partners in the region. Beijing is attempting to establish strong bilateral relationships with other Arctic countries. Russia is redeveloping key European partnerships as Crimean annexation fades from memory. Additionally, the Federation continues to expand cooperation with Arctic Council observer states Japan and South Korea. 

Countering the ‘Dragon-Bear’

Though American foreign policy makers remain adamantly opposed, a relaxation of measures against Russia is the clearest way to disrupt the ‘Dragon-Bear’ and normalize US-Russia relations in the Arctic. In 2012, President Medvedev expressed fears of the Federation becoming China’s ‘resource appendage’. Since, however, the number of joint infrastructure projects has exploded. Some Chinese investment in Russia’s far-east is to be expected and welcomed. However, the current level of exclusivity China enjoys is a looming threat to Russian sovereignty. Deprived of meaningful alternatives, Russia may have no choice but to integrate further into the ‘Dragon-Bear’—with all that entails for a free and fair Arctic.

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Dual-Purpose Diplomacy in the Arctic

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China’s rise is being felt across the world, and the Arctic is no exception. At the core of their ongoing near-Arctic power play is a ‘dual purpose’ approach. Under this model, activities like research expeditions lay the groundwork for military activities and power projection. 

The Danish intelligence service and American Department of Defense agree: China’s civilian research programs are likely being organized with future nuclear submarine deployments in mind. China has sought an Arctic submarine presence since 1959, under Mao Zedong. The logic is simple: any Russian or American ICBMs headed for China will fly over the Arctic Sea. A network of nuclear submarines would serve as a powerful deterrent.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection

In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) official policy was “near seas defense, far seas protection”. Neither China’s Arctic or National Defense policy papers, released in 2018 and 2019 respectively, mentioned a militarized presence in the High North. Crucially, both of these publications are intended to be widely read by foreign audiences.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection, Oceanic Presence, and Expansion into the Two Poles

In a 2018 issue of the PLAN’s official newspaper, Senior Captain Yu Wenbing noted a tactical transition from the PLAN’s 2015 slogan. Now, their policy would be “near seas defense, far seas protection, oceanic presence, and expansion into the two poles”. PLAN engineer Ni Hua expects required infrastructure development to be complete by 2030. There are countless other examples of PLAN officials invoking Arctic civilian infrastructure in models, projections, and policy proposals.

Routine research and economic activity are normalizing Chinese presence in the High North. While areas of study like bathymetrics and Arctic acoustics are nominally civilian, their most common applications are military. Both are essential for submarine and naval navigation. These operations typify the dual purpose paradigm at the center of Chinese Arctic operations.

Chinese Cooperation with Russia

China’s cooperation with Russia has greatly accelerated their Arctic development. The two cooperate intensively in Arctic trade, research, infrastructure, and general development of the North Sea Route. However, Russia has asserted itself against China in the past. In 2012, the Federation blocked Chinese research vessels from utilizing the North Sea Route. Should joint Arctic development cease to be mutually beneficial, Russian security concerns could unravel China’s advancements in the High North.

Arctic nations must familiarize themselves with China’s dual purpose approach in order to preserve their sovereignty. Deals and projects which may be profitable in the short term may easily become the foundation of future Chinese aggression. Without defensive measures, the High North could be dominated by a country over 1,000 miles away.

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A Fool’s Gold Deal

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In the upper reaches of Canada’s Nunavut province, the Inuit of Hope Bay anxiously await their gold mine’s fate. Shandong Gold (SD Gold), a Chinese state-owned mining megacorporation, has arranged to purchase Hope Bay gold mine. 

The owner of Hope Bay mine, Toronto’s TMAC Resources, is selling off the development intensive project at a premium. Though Canada boasts five of the ‘Big 10’ companies, Hope Bay and Nunavut are unique in that they employ primarily indigenous workers. In fact, they’re obligated by Canadian law to meet certain indigenous employment and compensation requirements.

In spite of this, the sale has not received approval from the Kitikmeot Inuit Association. Though not legally necessary, approval is of symbolic importance. Transferring mine ownership outside of Canadian hands may lead to complications in far-off courts with international tribunes. 

Are China’s interests in the Arctic benign?

Though some ‘experts’ claim China’s interests are purely commercial, Hope Bay would be yet another link in their ‘Polar Silk Road’. Its position along the Northwest Passage is invaluable for Arctic power projection. Given other recent PRC acquisitions, it is unrealistic to separate commercial interests from geostrategic influence. Money is power, after all.

Rylund Johnson, independent legislative representative of Yellowknife North, has called on Canada’s federal government to block the sale. In a statement, Johnson had this to say:

“If Canada had real economic development corporations and gave the North’s indigenous development corporations meaningful capital, then we could actually own some of our own resources as a country … As it is set up right now, China will keep stepping in when Canada fails to invest in its own development.”

A familiar story. Where Arctic nations fail to provide for their own people, or steward their own resources, the People’s Republic fills the gap. Cash for corporations, and polar power projection for China. 

Canada must defend its sovereignty and citizenry: reject the acquisition of Hope Bay. 

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Norwegian State Secretary Contradicts PM on China Threat

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Last week, China acquired nearly 13% of Norwegian Air. This week, Norwegian leadership can’t agree on whether the People’s Republic poses a threat. 

Prime Minister Erna Solberg singled out Russia and China for their aggressive position in the Arctic this April. PM Solberg denounced the two, saying they “do not see the value of…democracy, rule of law, nor…undisputed rights.” Her Defense Minister agreed, and outlined plans for an eight-year military spending increase amounting to $1.7 billion.

“These [China and Russia] are countries where the authorities do not see the value of neither democracy, rule of law, nor the fact that people have undisputed rights… Over the last years, these forces have become increasingly visible and gained more influence.”

Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg in April, 2020

However, State Secretary Audun Halvorsen of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pushed back against Solberg’s China policy this week. Responding to US State Department warnings about increased Sino-Russian cooperation in the North Sea, Halvorsen said Norway does not “perceive China to be a threat.” Halverson has a habit of minimizing China’s ambitions. Last year, he tamped down American concerns over the Chinese state’s involvement in Kirkenes, a strategic Northeast Passage port town.

Last May, Kirkenes welcomed ambassadors from the world’s largest port infrastructure developer. That developer is the state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). A successful CCCC bid for Kirkenes’ port infrastructure project means a CCP foothold in the High North. 

With a Kirkenes port, China’s ease of access to the Arctic increases significantly. A permanent CCP presence along the Northeast Passage means more power projection, more investment, and more influence. All to the detriment of Norwegian interests. 

Norway needs a coherent policy about Chinese intervention in the Arctic

Once Norway allows the People’s Republic in, there’s no going back. Secretary Halvorsen said China has “so far played a constructive role” – ‘so far’ being an important qualifier. If Kirkenes becomes flush with CCP cash, Norway would pay a political price for any future action against them. 

Norway needs a unified China policy to safeguard itself in an increasingly competitive Arctic. Halvorsen himself called for “unified Norwegian policy in the High North”, despite contradicting his own Prime Minister. PM Solberg is right. Norwegian sovereignty depends on fortified defense, NATO cooperation, and a frank acknowledgment of the CCP threat.