July 2020 - The Wallace Institute

South Korea and the Arctic

Since South Korea gained observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, the country has cultivated strategic Arctic partnerships. Most of their involvement in the region depends on these partners due to their “near-Arctic” status. Korea is primarily concerned with Arctic energy, and outlined the region’s importance in their 2012 policy masterplan.

Energy Dependence and Diversification

Importing a whopping 98% of its fossil fuels (which account for a majority of the country’s energy consumption), South Korea is highly dependent on the Gulf states. The country’s leadership is looking to diversify its energy imports, as well as produce more of their own. As a result, Korea is turning toward Russia, China, and other Asian countries for their energy needs.

Korea, Russia, and the New North

Korea’s “New Northern Policy” aims to develop stronger bilateral ties with Russia in the face of Western sanctions. As part of this, the two countries agreed to the “Nine Bridges Initiative”, a series of Arctic-related, mutual projects. South Korea built two-thirds of the world’s LNG tankers in operation today. Accordingly, the Republic aims to integrate its own Arctic-capable ships further into Russian LNG shipping. On land, the two countries are partnering to construct an LNG pipeline originating in Russia, passing through North Korea, and feeding into South Korea.

The Asian Arctic-Adjacent States, Scandinavia, and North America

The Republic’s Arctic ties with China and Japan are mostly research-related, but are moving toward further commercial integration. All three countries maintain an interest in the opening Northeast Passage, which significantly reduces shipping times to Europe. The possibility of a sub-organization for the three Arctic-adjacent Asian states is hotly-debated, but not yet realized. In the meantime, Korea remains an active observer in the Arctic Council, and its leadership conducts goodwill visits to the Scandinavian Arctic frequently.

Korea’s Arctic Future

Korean involvement in the Arctic revolves around trade and energy. Korea’s future in the Arctic depends largely on how ownership of emerging energy resources is decided and managed. The country is not positioned to unilaterally project power throughout the region, but the formation of sub-councils for the Arctic-adjacent Asian states could give the Republic increased diplomatic leverage.

The Arctic’s Closest Neighbor

As the Arctic’s value becomes more apparent and the region more accessible, several ‘near-Arctic’ states are moving to expand their polar influence. The success of China’s aggressive campaign depends on legitimizing this ‘near-Arctic’ identity. However, the People’s Republic is not the only non-Arctic state interested in the High North . The United Kingdom is building their own 21st century Arctic policy, and attempting to legitimize their identity as the region’s ‘closest neighbor’.

The Empire in the Arctic

The UK’s Arctic presence dates back to the 15th century, mostly concerned with uncovering new trade routes through to Asia.

Britain was an Arctic power until the late 1800s, when its last regional holdings were transferred to Canada. A strong British presence persisted until shortly after World War II, as a countermeasure against Germany and the Soviet Union. Since then, Britain’s observer status has rightfully limited their role in Arctic affairs.

With Scandinavian countries like Norway and Finland looking for safer alternatives to Russian partnership, the UK’s regional history and strong relationships open the door to meaningful involvement.

Geostrategy and the Northern Frontier

With the end of the post Cold War world order, geostrategic competition is increasing in the High North. The United Kingdom, concerned by possible Russian militarization and lockdown of the Arctic, increasingly views the region as critical to national security.

Two-thirds of Russia’s navy docks in the Kola Peninsula near Finland and could quickly bear down on Britain from the North Sea. Accordingly, the Royal Marines undertake cold weather training in the Scottish highlands regularly.

The United Kingdom and its Scandinavian partners are pushing for a permanent NATO presence in the Arctic as a ‘tripwire’ against Sino-Russian encroachment.

Commerce and Climate Change

Britain’s capital and expertise is attractive to Arctic states and projects. As such, the United Kingdom contributes to and cooperates with several EU and American-led development and research programs.

The UK’s position between the Atlantic, the European Continent, and the Arctic will prove advantageous as they maneuver to develop fishery access, cargo ports, energy infrastructure, and the tourism industry.

Britain’s contributions to climate research are somewhat disorganized, but considered a valuable asset by regional partners.

Deferential Diplomacy

The most significant obstacles to British success in the Arctic is the government’s lack of organization and focus. Though Britain’s Minister for European Neighbourhood and the Americas’ oversees the polar regions, there is no dedicated diplomat for the Arctic.

Britain’s web of investments, grants, and diplomatic commitments requires consistent and active engagement. The 2018 policy paper ‘Beyond the Ice’ presents a thorough vision for the future, largely maintaining a hands-off, conservative approach to Arctic involvement. If Britain maintains this limited engagement, they may be a positive force in Arctic affairs.
Norway, the UK’s closest Arctic ally, is wary of China and determined to move away from Russia. With Chinese investments threatening Arctic sovereignty, alternative partnerships are becoming more attractive.

Arctic-Adjacent Britain

With membership in the NATO umbrella and allies eager for increased British participation, Britain is poised to expand in the High North. To the extent the United Kingdom acts as a secondary partner, their contribution will be valuable. However, Arctic regional sovereignty remains essential for sustainable and secure regional development.

Russia’s 15 Year Plan for the Arctic

The Russian Arctic is remote, sparsely populated, and underdeveloped. As with the rest of the Arctic, this trifecta of challenges lends itself to organized, state-sponsored development. Accordingly, the Russian Federation recently unveiled a 15 year Arctic plan. “Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035” is an ambitious, goal-setting white paper in line with Russia’s previous Arctic policy.

Infrastructure and the North Sea Route

Infrastructure investment is slated to increase substantially. By 2035, the Federation will overhaul four airports, significantly expand preexisting railway and seaport networks, and construct at least 40 Arctic-capable ships. State gas and oil conglomerates will oversee the development of the North Sea Route (NSR). Today, the NSR hosts nearly 30 million tons of shipped goods. By 2035, Russia hopes to increase this to 80 million tons. In pursuit of this lofty goal, all new fiber-optic communication cables will be laid on the NSR seabed.

Poverty, Petrochemicals, and Industrialization

Unemployment and poverty have plagued the Russian Arctic for generations. As mentioned above, infrastructure development is a core component of the 2035 plan’s anti-poverty measures. Tax incentives are on offer for companies that invest in Arctic petrochemical projects. However, the plan goes farther. Direct payouts will be given to Russians who relocate to the High North. Demographic decline poses a real challenge to future exploitation of the region’s resources. Environmental effects, though considered, are of secondary importance compared to the national security implications of Siberian poverty, depopulation, and underdevelopment.

Territorial Integrity and Careful Cooperation

The Russian government rightfully sees China as a potential threat to its sovereignty. As such, Arctic cooperation has been reframed in terms of ‘stable mutual benefit’ versus unconditional cooperation. Russia is keen on developing investment relationships with other Arctic Council observer states to its east, like South Korea and Japan. Reducing reliance on Chinese capital is of concern for Russia, but policymakers are careful to avoid derailing the current Sino-Russian relationship and its ‘stable mutual benefit’.

Military modernization and ‘defensive military development’ remains a priority. The planned upgrades Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems will further integrate Russian Arctic military capabilities. However, the 2035 plan emphasizes international bodies and diplomatic organs as the primary means of ensuring territorial integrity. Russia is on track to hold the Arctic Council Presidency in 2021. The Federation accordingly seeks to empower the organization in dispute resolution, policymaking and so on. Furthermore, Russia will continue pressing its claims via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Responding to the 2035 Plan

Russia’s 2035 plan is sound Arctic policy, emphasizing national security and much needed regional development. Arctic-American security and quality of life depends on a similarly long-term vision for Alaska. The United States must embrace infrastructure development, anti-poverty policy, and military modernization to defend its interests and people.

The Arctic “Dragon-Bear”

Russia and China are regular collaborators. Their ‘special relationship’ began with the Soviet Union’s collapse, and developed rapidly after international backlash to Crimean annexation. The U.K. Chair of the House of Commons Defense Select Committee considers the two ‘one alliance’ in the Arctic.

Their Arctic relationship is primarily economic and diplomatic, with limited military cooperation. China has capital, and Russia has resources. Russia has access to Arctic institutions, and China needs in. Despite this joint success, the ‘Dragon-Bear’ alliance’s mutual geopolitical suspicions pose a threat to the duo’s long term success.

Joint Projects and Collaboration

Russia and China recently completed the ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline, a $400 billion project carrying natural gas from northeast Russia to the coal-fired Jilin province. As a result of the first’s success, a ‘Power of Siberia II’ is under discussion. The pipeline typifies one half of the Sino-Russian Arctic alliance, with China providing the investment necessary to exploit Russian resources.

The other half of the Arctic Dragon-Bear hinges on institutional access. Climate researchers from both countries agreed last year to establish a joint research station. Though the project explicitly concerns itself with the High North’s changing ecosystem, the center serves a dual-purpose. Chinese politician Arken Imirbaki took the opportunity to re-emphasize his country’s legitimate interests in the region as a ‘near-Arctic’ country. Sino-Russian civilian collaboration in the Arctic inevitably normalizes China’s presence in the region.

Areas of Tension

Russia understandably sees the Arctic as integral to its national security and identity. Accordingly, the Federation is wary of allowing unrestricted access to its sparsely-populated eastern flank. Since Russia’s Arctic development corporations require significant capital and technology investment, China is unwilling to partner without substantial control. This issue prevents the alliance from integrating further.

China’s ‘near-Arctic’ interests, though recognized by Russia, are an existential threat to the Federation’s sovereignty. The People’s Republic is granted significant access to pre-existing Arctic institutions, but Russia actively discourages the formation of new, broader organizations. The Kremlin has repeatedly “underlined that observer status can be reconsidered and even revoked” in the event of threatening behavior. Last month, Russia sent a heavy-handed signal: accusing its leading Arctic researcher of spying for China. This allegation comes just months after Putin’s ‘Arctic 2035’ policy rollout.

Diplomatic Diversification

Both China and Russia are on the prowl for alternative partners in the region. Beijing is attempting to establish strong bilateral relationships with other Arctic countries. Russia is redeveloping key European partnerships as Crimean annexation fades from memory. Additionally, the Federation continues to expand cooperation with Arctic Council observer states Japan and South Korea.

Countering the ‘Dragon-Bear’

Though American foreign policy makers remain adamantly opposed, a relaxation of measures against Russia is the clearest way to disrupt the ‘Dragon-Bear’ and normalize US-Russia relations in the Arctic. In 2012, President Medvedev expressed fears of the Federation becoming China’s ‘resource appendage’. Since, however, the number of joint infrastructure projects has exploded. Some Chinese investment in Russia’s far-east is to be expected and welcomed. However, the current level of exclusivity China enjoys is a looming threat to Russian sovereignty. Deprived of meaningful alternatives, Russia may have no choice but to integrate further into the ‘Dragon-Bear’—with all that entails for a free and fair Arctic.

Dual-Purpose Diplomacy in the Arctic

China’s rise is being felt across the world, and the Arctic is no exception. At the core of their ongoing near-Arctic power play is a ‘dual purpose’ approach. Under this model, activities like research expeditions lay the groundwork for military activities and power projection.

The Danish intelligence service and American Department of Defense agree: China’s civilian research programs are likely being organized with future nuclear submarine deployments in mind. China has sought an Arctic submarine presence since 1959, under Mao Zedong. The logic is simple: any Russian or American ICBMs headed for China will fly over the Arctic Sea. A network of nuclear submarines would serve as a powerful deterrent.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection

In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) official policy was “near seas defense, far seas protection”. Neither China’s Arctic or National Defense policy papers, released in 2018 and 2019 respectively, mentioned a militarized presence in the High North. Crucially, both of these publications are intended to be widely read by foreign audiences.

Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection, Oceanic Presence, and Expansion into the Two Poles

In a 2018 issue of the PLAN’s official newspaper, Senior Captain Yu Wenbing noted a tactical transition from the PLAN’s 2015 slogan. Now, their policy would be “near seas defense, far seas protection, oceanic presence, and expansion into the two poles”. PLAN engineer Ni Hua expects required infrastructure development to be complete by 2030. There are countless other examples of PLAN officials invoking Arctic civilian infrastructure in models, projections, and policy proposals.

Routine research and economic activity are normalizing Chinese presence in the High North. While areas of study like bathymetrics and Arctic acoustics are nominally civilian, their most common applications are military. Both are essential for submarine and naval navigation. These operations typify the dual purpose paradigm at the center of Chinese Arctic operations.

Chinese Cooperation with Russia

China’s cooperation with Russia has greatly accelerated their Arctic development. The two cooperate intensively in Arctic trade, research, infrastructure, and general development of the North Sea Route. However, Russia has asserted itself against China in the past. In 2012, the Federation blocked Chinese research vessels from utilizing the North Sea Route. Should joint Arctic development cease to be mutually beneficial, Russian security concerns could unravel China’s advancements in the High North.

Arctic nations must familiarize themselves with China’s dual purpose approach in order to preserve their sovereignty. Deals and projects which may be profitable in the short term may easily become the foundation of future Chinese aggression. Without defensive measures, the High North could be dominated by a country over 1,000 miles away.

Monthly Archives: July 2020